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The arithmetic of Fair Dealing at  
the supreme Court of Canada
giuseppina d’agostino1 
In the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada copyright cases, the Court 
found an opportunity to redefine the law of fair dealing in Canada. 
While the Court acknowledged that fair dealing is a question of fact, 
and thereby properly adjudicated by triers of fact like the Copyright 
Board of Canada, the Court stepped in to revisit the facts all over 
again. When compared to its common law counterparts like the 
UK and the US, Canada stands alone in its willingness to rehear fair 
dealing cases, which are a matter of first impression.2 I argue that while 
it is salutary to re-emphasize the existence of users’ rights as per CCH 
v Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH], and indeed that these rights 
are here to stay, it cannot be beneficial for the Court to reinterpret 
the facts, which is the job of courts and tribunals of first instance, or 
to make policy, which is the job of government; here, unfortunately, 
the Court indulged in both. In its reasoning, the Supreme Court of 
Canada showcases rigid reliance on CCH’s six-factor framework and 
elevates the framework to the level of law.3 Ironically, in doing so, 
the Supreme Court of Canada is actually going against the spirit and 
the benefit that CCH created for copyright law in Canada and, more 
specifically, for fair dealing. 
6
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Fair Dealing and the Copyright Pentalogy
The Supreme Court of Canada released five copyright cases, 
commonly referred to as the copyright pentalogy, on the same day 
in July 2012, setting abuzz all circles in the legal community and 
beyond. Many fundamental copyright issues were raised: delineating 
the scope of various rights and the overlapping nature of rights in 
the Copyright Act, technological neutrality, questions of payment 
and, more broadly, appropriate standards of review, as each of these 
cases originated from the Federal Court of Appeal’s judicial review of 
the Copyright Board of Canada decisions. Among the five cases, two 
dealt squarely with the doctrine of fair dealing: within certain limits, 
what a user can do with a substantial part of a copyright work without 
permission of the owner.4 
In Canada, the doctrine of fair dealing is statutorily entrenched 
in the Copyright Act. As a result of the recently enacted Copyright 
Modernization Act, there are now five allowable purposes for fair 
dealing: (1) research or private study (s. 29); (2) criticism or review (s. 
29.1); (3) news reporting (s. 29.2); (4) parody or satire (s. 29); and (5) 
education (s. 29).5 Fair dealing is a question of fact and a matter of first 
impression.6 The onus is on the defendant to prove that the dealing 
(1) fits within one of the enumerated allowable purposes; (2) is “fair”; 
and (3) for “criticism or review” and “news reporting”, sufficient 
acknowledgement is given. In CCH, a unanimous Supreme Court of 
Canada ruled that fair dealing, alongside the other exceptions in the 
Copyright Act, “must not be interpreted restrictively”7 and that more 
or less six factors may be used when assessing fairness.8 In that case, 
the Law Society of Upper Canada did not infringe copyright, because 
its Great Library request-based reproduction services fell squarely 
within the allowances of the fair dealing doctrine. Lawyers carrying 
on the business of law for profit were held to be conducting non-
infringing research. Research should be accorded a “large and liberal 
interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly 
constrained.”9
In SOCAN v Bell [Bell], Abella J for a unanimous court agreed 
with the Board that song previews provided by Internet service 
providers for consumers constituted fair dealing for the purposes 
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of research and thus were not subject to a tariff. Consistent with the 
spirit of CCH, the term “research” should be given a “large and liberal 
interpretation”. For the Court, it would be far too restrictive to limit 
“research” to its ordinary meaning, as it can include “many activities 
that do not demand the establishment of new facts or conclusions. It 
can be piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can be 
undertaken for no purpose except personal interest.”10
On the other hand, Alberta (Education) was a heavily contentious 
case, with a 5-4 split decision over the appropriate deference afforded 
to the Board and the interpretation of fair dealing. At issue was 
whether copies made at the teacher’s initiative in Kindergarten to 
Grade 12 classrooms and provided to students with instructions to 
read the material were made for the allowable purpose of research or 
private study.11 While the matter was sent back to the Copyright Board 
for reconsideration, the Board later ruled that the copying at issue was 
fair dealing.12 For Abella J’s majority, the Board misinterpreted the six 
fair dealing factors. For Rothstein J’s dissent, the six factors are not 
statutory enactments; fair dealing is a question of fact, and deference 
should be accorded to the Board. In both cases, the Court seized the 
opportunity to clarify the interpretive framework set out in CCH.13
In Bell, Abella J clarified that a generous, “low-threshold” 
interpretation should occur for the first part of the test, with respect 
to determining the allowable purposes, “so that the analytical heavy-
hitting is done in determining whether the dealing was fair.”14 While 
the Court is quite liberal in the first part of the test—some would say 
too liberal15—it is ironically rigid in the fairness analysis. 
What follows is a discussion of the Court’s enthusiasm to rehear 
facts when it does not agree with the outcome, in specific reference to 
(1) an emerging user perspective test the Court used for determining 
both the allowable purpose to warrant fair dealing and the first 
fairness factor (i.e. the purpose of the dealing), and (2) the Court’s 
general approach to determine fairness: by methodically examining 
each of the six fairness factors proposed in CCH. I will tackle the 
latter first, as I find this development the most troubling. 
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(1) Six Factors Sequence
In every decision since CCH, the courts have embraced a wholesale, 
mechanistic and absolutist adoption of the six factors. As a result, 
each factor is interpreted each and every time and in the same 
sequence. As Rothstein J rightly points out in the dissent of Alberta 
(Education), these are not statutory requirements.16 As set out in 
CCH, and as I previously argued, CCH endorsed certain factors that 
may be more or less relevant in future fair dealing cases. Here it is 
particularly important to revisit Linden JA’s initial pronouncement 
of the interpretive fairness framework later endorsed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in CCH:
Assessing these observations in combination with the 
American and British factors, I have compiled a list 
of factors that should influence the fairness of the Law 
Society’s dealings with the Publishers’ works on behalf 
of patrons of the Great Library. Importantly, the elements 
of fairness are malleable and must be tailored to each 
unique circumstance. None of the factors are conclusive 
or binding, and additional considerations may well apply 
uniquely in the Canadian context. However, the following 
factors are usually among the non-exhaustive list of 
considerations: (1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the 
nature of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) 
alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work in 
question; and (6) the effect of the dealing on that work.17
Significantly, CCH also acknowledged that other considerations or 
unnamed factors could be used to assess the fairness of a dealing. 
The six factors emerged as indicia for that particular case, for those 
particular facts,18 drawing from the UK and US approaches.19 Yet, 
since then, each case involving fair dealing has proceeded to showcase 
a scrupulous and exclusive adherence to these six factors. 
Ironically, this six-factor absolutism all started with the Copyright 
Board. Shortly after CCH was decided, in Tariff 22.A the Board 
considered the doctrine of fair dealing even though it was not pleaded 
by the parties. The Board acknowledged that, “[a]lthough none of the 
parties addressed the legal issue directly, we must deal with it”20 to 
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ascertain whether the way in which services deal with previews was in 
fact a protected act under the Copyright Act.21 The Board found that 
streaming a musical preview with a view to deciding whether to purchase 
a download or CD constituted “research.”22 As I previously argued, “[t]he 
Board thus embraced the liberal lead of CCH and systematically applied 
its six fair dealing factors.”23 Since then, parties on either side (and here 
the Board or the Court is not alone in its unequivocal embrace) have 
argued fair dealing cases based on the six factors.
Finally, before the Supreme Court of Canada, in Bell, the Court 
acknowledged that fairness is a question of fact and similarly 
proceeded to mechanically consider each of the six factors:
(1) Purpose of the dealing: as discussed more fully later, 
the Court adopted an (end) user perspective test: the 
purpose of providing previews is primarily to facilitate 
research by consumers.24 Interestingly, similar to CCH, 
under this factor, the Court examined the Internet 
service provider’s behaviour and acknowledged that the 
Internet service provider put “reasonable safeguards in 
place to ensure that the users’ dealing in previews was in 
fact for this purpose: the previews were streamed, short, 
and often of lesser quality than the musical work itself. 
These safeguards prevented the previews from replacing 
the work while still fulfilling a research function.”25
(2) Character of the dealing: The Court played down 
the CCH observation that a particular dealing must 
be unfair if multiple copies of works are being widely 
distributed. It noted that if the use of the work was “for 
a specific legitimate purpose, or if the copy no longer 
existed after it was used, this would favour a finding 
of fairness.”26 In this case, each file was automatically 
deleted and so could not be duplicated or disseminated 
by users.27
(3) Amount of the dealing: Referring to the quantity 
of the work taken, and agreeing with the Board, the 
Court ruled that the correct interpretation is the length 
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of each preview compared to the length of the work 
(and not, as SOCAN argued, the aggregate number of 
previews streamed by consumers).28 Importantly, the 
Court noted that the character of the dealing (factor no. 
2) considers the aggregate of the dissemination already: 
that is, whether multiple copies of works are being 
widely distributed. As a result, considering the number 
of previews streamed under “amount of the dealing” 
(factor no. 3) would “deprive that factor of any utility 
in the analysis, and would erase consideration of the 
proportion of the excerpt of the entire work.”29 Also, the 
Court continued, “given the ease and magnitude with 
which digital works are disseminated over the Internet”, 
focusing on the number of previews streamed would 
lead to disproportionate and unfair findings when 
compared to non-digital works and would go against 
the “goal of technological neutrality.”30 In passing, it 
is unclear how technological neutrality can be seen 
to support the Court’s position, as the goal of “media 
neutrality” in Robertson was said not to override in any 
way authors’ rights.31 Here again, the Court focused on 
the ease of dissemination of works and had a user focus. 
(4) Alternatives to the dealing: A dealing may be less 
fair if there is a non–copyright protected equivalent 
that could have been used, or if the dealing was not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate purpose. 
While SOCAN argued that there were other methods 
available (e.g., advertising with album artwork, textual 
descriptions and return policies for buying the wrong 
work), the Court agreed with the Board that “[l]istening 
to a preview probably is the most practical, most 
economical and safest way for users to ensure that they 
purchase what they wish.”32 In other words, “short, low-
quality streamed previews are reasonably necessary to 
help consumers decide what to purchase.”33
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(5) Nature of the work: This factor examines whether the 
work is one that should be widely disseminated. Here the 
Court pointed out that just because the previews were 
widely available does not mean that they were widely 
disseminated; if consumers are unable to locate and 
identify the work they wish to purchase, the work will 
not be disseminated.34
(6) The effect of the dealing on the work: This point 
evaluates whether the dealing adversely affects or 
competes with the work. Here the Court harkened 
back to the observation in factor no. 5: because of their 
short duration and lower quality, previews are not in 
competition with downloads of the work itself. For the 
Court, there was the opposite effect, as previews increase 
the sale and therefore the dissemination of musical 
works, “thereby generating remuneration to their 
creators.”35
In sum, the Court was satisfied with the Board’s balancing of the 
purposes of the Act. Practically, consumers should not need to pay for 
previews as their free access encourages creation and dissemination 
of works while ensuring that creators are fairly rewarded. Ultimately, 
while the Court was satisfied by the Board’s application of CCH in 
finding fair dealing in Bell, it was not in Alberta (Education); in fact, 
the outcome was quite different.
Dangers Regarding the six-factor sequence: Double Counting 
The Alberta (Education) case illustrates a danger in the Court’s 
unique judicial adherence to CCH and its willingness to rehear facts. 
In Alberta (Education), Abella J had “concerns over how the Board 
applied several of those factors.”36 Among the various problems with 
the Board’s application of the CCH factors (e.g., purpose of the dealing 
factor [factor no. 1], which Abella J found problematic because it hinges 
on the user perspective),37 she took great pains to go through the six 
factors, which I will not repeat here. As an example, she indicated that 
the Board misinterpreted the factors and drew the wrong conclusions 
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under the “character of the dealing” and the “amount of the dealing.” 
Significantly, for Abella J, this double counting was an error of law 
that rendered the Board decision unreasonable. The majority found 
problematic that the “quantification of the total amount of pages 
copied” should be considered under “character of the dealing” and 
not under the “amount of the dealing”. As a result of this analytical 
framework, by the time the Board assessed the “amount of the dealing” 
factor (factor no. 3), it had already considered the quantification of 
the dissemination: “[i]n reapplying this same quantitative concern 
when assessing the ‘amount of the dealing’, it conflated the two 
factors, which had the effect of erasing proportionality from the 
fairness analysis.”38 In short, the “amount of the dealing factor” is not 
a quantitative assessment based on aggregate use, but an examination 
of the proportionality of the amount copied to the whole of the work. 
Aggregate use or quantification of the total amount of pages copied 
should be considered under the “character of the dealing”.
It is not at all clear how the Board erased proportionality from the 
fairness analysis when it made findings of fact that teachers copied 
“short excerpts”, and that these short excerpts were repeatedly copied 
by the same “class set” of books over a period of time.39 Based on 
the extensive evidence advanced by the parties, the Board concluded 
that this repeated copying tended to make the dealing more unfair. 
At what exact point in Abella J’s six-factor sequence these facts were 
found should not be seen to invalidate a relative assessment of factors 
that are not themselves the law, nor render a decision unreasonable; 
nor should any one factor be interpreted as more important than 
another. In essence, Abella J’s point-by-point analysis is perplexing. 
Why would it be necessary to ensure that factor x be examined under 
y? The importance is that it is examined. Why be mechanistic to 
the point of rendering a decision unreasonable? After all, it was the 
same court that posited that fair dealing warrants a large and liberal 
interpretation. As Rothstein J indicates, the appellants themselves 
did not dispute the Board’s findings of fact40 and its conclusions 
were derived independently through an analysis that considered all 
aspects of the dealing. As a result, “unless it is shown that the Board’s 
conclusion of fact that the books from the ‘class sets’ will be subject 
to ‘numerous requests’ was unreasonable, then the Board’s decision 
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should not be disturbed.” 41 Consequently, what we see is that undue 
rigidity in interpreting the six factors, sequentially, in the same order, 
further muddles the state of the Canadian law of fair dealing. 
What may be more consistent with CCH and its large and liberal 
interpretation of fair dealing can be seen in other case law. For 
instance, the court in Warman v Fournier (2012)42 found fair dealing 
in the context of news reporting. Free dominion, an online political 
discussion forum, posted an article first published in the National Post. 
Among the works in question was an excerpt of an eleven-paragraph 
article that consisted of the headline, three complete paragraphs and 
part of a fourth paragraph.43 Rennie J for the Federal Court found fair 
dealing for the purposes of news reporting, pursuant to s 29.2 of the 
Copyright Act. The Federal Court applied CCH and adopted a “large 
and liberal interpretation” of the use of the excerpt to constitute news 
reporting as it promulgated the facts in the article.44 The Federal Court 
noted that CCH “sets out important guiding principles in applying 
the fair dealing exception.”45 As a result, the Court did not undertake 
a mechanistic interpretation of each of the six factors, as “CCH set 
out several factors that may be relevant in determining whether the 
dealing is fair….”46
The Federal Court liberally referred to the factors and noted that an 
application of some factors militated toward a finding of fair dealing. It 
noted the purpose of the dealing to be satisfied, the amount to be limited 
and the nature of the work to favour fair dealing. Here the Federal 
Court acknowledged that the article was not currently published, and 
this finding supported fair dealing, as one of the purposes of copyright 
law is to promote wider dissemination of works.47 On the other hand, 
the Federal Court asserted that some factors weighed less strongly in 
favour of a finding of fair dealing (e.g., “alternative to the dealing”, as 
a summary could have been provided instead, and “character of the 
dealing”, as the excerpts were widely distributed on the Internet). On 
balance, while some factors were not well satisfied, the reproduction 
constituted fair dealing.48 Whether the court was correct in finding 
fair dealing is not my purpose here; rather, I want to point out that the 
Federal Court’s approach in Warman was more flexible and true to the 
large and liberal interpretation that CCH intended compared to the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Alberta (Education).
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Of interest is that in Warman, the Federal Court also interpreted 
the doctrine of substantial part. While the test is also fact based and 
factor based, the Court found that no substantial part of the work 
in question was copied and noted that “most of the factors are not 
directly relevant in this case given the circumstances”.49 Like fair 
dealing, substantial part is a question of fact and involves a qualitative 
rather than quantitative analysis. There is no reason why the same 
liberal approach used in another long-standing copyright doctrine 
cannot also be used to interpret the factor framework set out in CCH. 
Warman is currently being appealed in a post-pentalogy, post–
Copyright Modernization Act environment. How the Federal Court of 
Appeal interprets CCH will be important and telling of whether the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s mechanical interpretation as seen in Bell 
and Alberta (Education) will prevail, or whether CCH’s more flexible 
framework will be followed.
some Observations on the six Factors
There may be various reasons to explain why the courts (and parties, 
too) adhere to a six-factor approach. For instance, an explanation may 
be that the need to address calls for more flexibility is still seen as 
required in fair dealing and, at the same time, there is a starvation 
for more certainty. Perhaps there is still a lingering view that the US 
fair use model with enumerated factors is the panacea;50 however, 
as I have already argued at length, fair use continues to confound 
common law jurisdictions, and after CCH, Canada boasted the most 
flexible approach compared to the US and the UK.51 It is doubtful 
that achieving clarity by treating the six factors as law, and ultimately 
reinterrogating the facts considered in their application, is salutary. 
Indeed, as illustrated by the recent cases, it leads to more complexity, 
ambiguity and, ironically, rigidity. It is also unfortunate that no new 
factors have been considered. Note that in the US, where the fair use 
factors are statutorily entrenched, the courts also consider others.52 
For example, in Basic Books v Kinko’s Graphics Corp,53 the United 
States Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that uses of 
copyright material for educational purposes by Kinko’s, a commercial 
enterprise, were not fair use. In making its assessment, the Court 
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found that most of the factors weighed against fair use and considered 
two other factors: “monopolistic and competitive practices” (along 
with necessity) and “industry practices and institutional policies”.54 
In Canada, previous fair dealing cases before CCH had weighed other 
factors, such as motive (i.e. good or bad faith). In Boudreau v Lin, 
no fair dealing was found for private study with regard to substantial 
use of portions of a student’s work in a professor’s paper. The court 
zeroed in on the fraudulent nature of the dealing. The defendant, 
a professor at the University of Ottawa, had “actively” deleted the 
student’s name from the paper, replaced it with his own, along with 
that of an associate, presented the paper at a conference without 
credit, and sold copies of the paper to other students.55 Because of 
the defendant’s underhanded conduct, the court mandated that fair 
dealing be “restrictively interpreted.”56 As previously argued, it will be 
important to see the extent to which future cases account for bad faith. 
In CCH, the Great Library’s closely enforced Access Policy cast the 
defendant in a positive light. It is noteworthy that UK courts account 
for bad faith as well.57 While the 2012 Canadian pentalogy cases did 
not consider this factor, it does seem appropriate that courts closely 
read the evidence and assess the good or bad faith conduct of the 
defendant. The very notion of fairness in fair dealing is antithetical to 
underhanded behaviour. Fair dealing should not be used to shield such 
conduct. At the same time, it is appropriate that good faith conduct, as 
is clear in the Great Library’s prudent practices, should weigh in favour 
of fairness or, at the very least, militate against harsher damages.58 Of 
course it is possible that good or bad faith can be accounted for in 
one of the six factors (i.e. purpose of the dealing or character of the 
dealing factors.)59 My point here is that it is less significant whether 
bad faith is treated as a separate factor or under an existing factor; it 
is important that, if relevant, bad faith should be considered in fair 
dealing cases when assessing fairness and, ultimately, damages. 
Parties pleading fair dealing, and courts ultimately deciding those 
cases, should exercise flexibility when interpreting fair dealing: raise 
factors germane to the case and assess evidence to support them. Whether 
there are six factors, or seven factors, or four factors should not be the 
driving preoccupation. And whether one piece of evidence is considered 
at the wrong part of the equation should be seen with a more flexible lens. 
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User Perspective for allowable Purpose and Purpose of  
the Dealing 
A type of user-perspective test has surfaced from the recent Canadian 
copyright cases. In CCH, while it was clear that users’ rights count, 
it was unclear whose perspective should carry more weight.60 CCH 
noted that an “objective test” should be adopted to assess the users’ 
real purpose or motive in using the copyright work (factor no. 1). 
The recent Supreme Court of Canada cases clarify that it is the end 
user’s perspective that counts. In Bell, it was the consumer’s, not the 
Internet service provider’s,61 and in Alberta (Education), it was the 
students’, not entirely the teachers’, and certainly not the copyright 
holders’ perspective that counted.62 
In Bell, the Court emphasized that the perspective of the end user 
should be the primary driver of the first part of the fair dealing analysis 
and for the allowable purpose factor.63 The consumer ultimately 
triggers meeting copyright’s objectives: “consumers used previews 
for the purpose of conducting research to identify which music to 
purchase, purchases which trigger dissemination of musical works 
and compensation for their creators, both of which are outcomes the 
Act seeks to encourage.”64 The Court’s privileging of the end user is 
important, as it signals its need to restore what it perceives as persistent 
inequities in the copyright system, where consumers are seen to be 
gouged.65 Here Rothstein J’s remarks in an IP Osgoode public lecture 
after the pentalogy are apt: “Judges don’t like double-dipping. And if 
they think someone is double-dipping, they will go into contortions 
to preclude it.”66 So, however meritorious the double-dipping claim 
(i.e. someone seen to be paying twice, or someone seems to be earning 
twice for the same thing), decision makers may well disregard other 
relevant arguments. In ESAC, statutory interpretation questions were 
trumped by double-dipping claims.67 In the context of the Alberta 
(Education) and Bell cases, similar pro-user, pro-consumer principles 
may well have informed the majority’s findings of fair dealing in 
favour of students and consumers. 
For Abella J, CCH focused its investigation on the ultimate 
user, the lawyers, whose purpose was legal research, and not on 
the librarian’s purpose.68 Without the librarians, it would have been 
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impossible for the lawyers to access the materials. Librarians were seen 
as integral to the research process as enablers.69 The librarians “don’t 
profit from this service.”70 In Bell, more problematic is the provider’s 
purpose (i.e. Bell, Apple, Rogers, Shaw and Telus), as its scope is less 
altruistic than a librarian’s. Yet, applying the end user perspective and, 
indeed, a relatively low threshold, allows entry into the enumerated 
allowable grounds of fair dealing, and into the second part of the 
test on fairness. The second part of the test, and in particular factor 
one, the purpose of the dealing, also adopts a user-perspective test. 
The purpose of providing previews is primarily to facilitate research 
purposes of the consumers.71 Here, the Internet service provider’s 
safeguards could be seen as akin to the librarian’s gatekeeping role in 
CCH.72 The Court examined the Internet service provider’s behaviour 
and acknowledged that it put “reasonable safeguards” in place to 
ensure that the users’ dealing in previews was in fact for research, as 
“the previews were streamed, short, and often of lesser quality than 
the musical work itself ”.73 Consequently, these safeguards prevented 
the previews from replacing the work while still fulfilling a research 
function.74
By contrast, the Alberta (Education) case was more controversial. 
While there was no disagreement that the first step of the dealing was 
for the allowable ground of research or private study,75 the end-user 
perspective as it related to the first factor caused disagreement. 
Abella J, for the majority, stated that the teachers and students 
have a symbiotic purpose: teachers are there to facilitate the students’ 
research and private study.76 Teachers have no ulterior motive 
when providing copies to students, nor do teachers make these for 
their own use. For Abella J, the Board drove an “artificial wedge” in 
distinguishing between copies made by the teacher at the request of a 
student, and copies made by the teacher on their own initiative.77 In the 
end, distinguishing between these types of copies is irrelevant to the 
ultimate end user, the student engaging in research and private study.
Rothstein J, on the other hand, stated that the Board made no 
reviewable error and that the Court should not slip into a more 
intrusive correctness review. The Board’s “detailed and extensive 
analysis and decision were intelligible, transparent and justifiable.”78 
In other words, Abella J seized on “a few arguable statements or 
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intermediate findings.”79 For Rothstein J, the Board made a reasonable 
factual conclusion and appropriately considered that the “teacher’s 
purpose was relevant and predominant on the facts in this case.”80 
The teacher’s purpose was to instruct and educate the students, “the 
essence of the job of teaching.”81 Consequently, the teacher’s role 
in selecting and photocopying excerpts is for their own use and is 
“significantly different than the role of the Great Library Staff in CCH, 
which was completely passive.”82 But for the patron requests at the 
Great Library, there would be no copies. Ultimately, the copying in 
Alberta (Education) mainly served the teacher’s purpose of teaching, 
and this was a “realistic assessment of classroom teaching.”
In Alberta (Education), there is a distinction as the majority sees 
the end user as the ultimate perspective; where there are other users 
in between (e.g., teachers), those users serve a symbiotic purpose with 
the end user. For the dissent, one cannot be at the Supreme Court 
to rehear the facts, especially where the issues are “fact-based, as in 
the case of a fair dealing analysis.”83 The Board already observed the 
teacher’s role in the copying as the predominant perspective and as 
triers of fact they were in the best position to do so. 
In the result, when both fair dealing cases are considered 
together, the end-user perspective counts (certainly in Bell). But 
the question remains: Who is the end user? And when is there a 
predominant user? Can the purpose of the in-between users, such 
as Internet service providers, teachers and librarians, be subsumed 
in the end users as a symbiotic purpose, such as consumers, students 
and lawyers? The dissent didn’t think so in Alberta (Education), yet 
in Bell, there was one end user. Curiously, Abella J disregards various 
common law precedents, as they stand for the principle that “copiers 
cannot camouflage their own distinct purpose by purporting to 
conflate it with the research or study purposes of the ultimate user.”84 
Similarly, Rothstein J suggests that the predominant purpose is the 
way to resolve this: when the in-between user is copying to fulfill their 
own distinct ends.85 Ultimately, whether one looks at the end user or 
predominant user, the answer needs to be one grounded in fact, as 
opposed to policy.
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Policy Making at the supreme Court of Canada 
When compared to Canada’s common law counterparts, such as the 
UK and the US, Canada stands alone in its enthusiasm to rehear fair 
dealing cases, which are a matter of first impression.86 So while the 
Court acknowledged that fair dealing is a question of fact and thereby 
properly adjudicated by the lower courts (or, in this case, expert 
tribunals like the Copyright Board of Canada), the Court steps in to 
revisit the facts. This Canadian interventionism is set against other 
higher courts that rarely rehear fair dealing cases. In fact, over the last 
twenty years, the UK House of Lords, the Australian High Court and 
the Supreme Court of New Zealand have heard no fair dealing cases, 
the US Supreme Court has heard two fair use cases87 and Canada has 
now heard three fair dealing cases88 and has noted its importance in 
copyright law in another.89 It seems that when common law courts 
outside of Canada do hear fair dealing cases, they are contained to 
their role of judicial interpretation and do not overreach into law and 
policy making.90
What seems to be at the core of the Court’s approach in the six-
factored fair dealing evaluation and the end-user perspective test is 
its ongoing preoccupation with users. The outcome in these cases is 
seen in Alberta (Education), where Rothstein J would like the Court 
to confine itself to its role to interpret the law, while the majority 
prefers to disregard evidence-based analysis that already occurred at 
the Copyright Board, and to reinterpret the facts so as to fit its own 
view of the law and policy. In Alberta (Education), the Court seems 
to favour a worldview of open, accessible and free collaboration 
and commerce where the end users, the students, are centre stage. 
Abella J intimates that creative content, the raw materials that can 
stimulate learning, creative thinking and, ultimately, the economy, 
should not be “locked away” in tariffs, burdened by additional fees, 
but should be given the widest possible access.91 It seems the majority 
wants to encourage dissemination from the ground up. The cases thus 
prioritize the rights of the individual and everyday user, who would 
likely have been most affected by the tariffs.
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This development continues to be expected. As I have argued in 
Healing Fair Dealing, because of the increasing expanse of owner’s 
rights (more works subject to copyright protection, and subject 
to different types of intellectually property rights), longer terms of 
protections and more grounds of (criminal) liability, there has been 
a push back to create more rights for users.92 The recent Copyright 
Modernization Act consultations and accompanying commentary in 
the online, terrestrial and media space is evidence of this push. The 
need to support user rights is equally unsurprising. As David Vaver 
has recently argued: 
It may not just be the Charter that is affecting how the 
Supreme Court views copyright today. International 
human rights law may be playing its part too. … For 
when Justice Abella spoke of achieving a “proper balance 
between protection and access”, she was partly reflecting 
how international human rights law treats IP.93 
Vaver notes that while Rothstein J dissented in Alberta (Education), 
in Bell, Abella J spoke for a unanimous court.94 And so, all the judges 
shared her position on at least some fundamental aspects of the role 
of copyright law in a modern society.
Another development that continues, and this one is unfortunate, 
is that creators are still the castaways in the copyright balance. Since 
Théberge, courts have come to see promoting the public interest as 
against rewarding the creators.95 So while the Court is correct to 
state that there has been a shift in its preoccupation toward users, 
as confirmed in CCH, I would hesitate to endorse its view that 
Canada had an author-centric view to begin with.96 In fact, authors 
have been the rhetorical stand-ins for owners since the onset of 
copyright law.97 In reality, with little adequate copyright protection, 
contract law governs authors’ rights, and they typically transfer their 
rights to new owners (i.e. publishers and others) who give little in 
return.98 As a result, what we continue to see in the jurisprudence is a 
welcome pronouncement of users’ rights and a lack of consideration 
of authors (and the unsatisfactory realities they also face), who are 
also integral to the balancing formula for copyright and an essential 
part in furthering the public interest. What may be more accurate to 
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reflect in the literature and case law is a need to limit less the author’s 
and more the owner’s rights.99 Unfortunately, in Bell, Abella J suggests 
that in privileging the user, copyright law’s objectives are met, as more 
buying will lead to more purchases and compensation to creators.100 
What the Court assumes will happen (i.e. compensation for creators) 
is a stretch for a number of reasons not limited to consumers actually 
buying the music, nor to creators ultimately receiving compensation 
from the current configuration of copyright management.
Parting Thoughts
Because of the copyright pentalogy, what we now have is, ironically, 
a fair dealing framework that is far more rigid than before. While 
fair dealing is said to be a matter of fact and impression and was to 
have been given a large and liberal interpretation per CCH, assessing 
fairness has now become arithmetic. In addition, the Court has sent 
the message that parties must avoid double counting or their case 
will be found to be unreasonable. What would be unfortunate and 
counter CCH is that if each of the six factors was not considered in 
future cases, or if fewer factors were considered, it would likely create 
grounds for appeal. If Parliament wanted each of the fair dealing 
factors to be considered as law, it would have said so in the copyright 
amendments.101 If Parliament wanted to ensure that a Berne three-step 
analysis be included in section 29 of the Copyright Act or if it wanted 
to indicate that one fair dealing factor had priority over the others, it 
would have said so as well.102 Its reticence can be taken as agreement 
that CCH’s large and liberal interpretation with its more or less six 
factors is sufficiently clear and is the correct framework. 
Rather, Parliament found it important to expand on the 
enumerated categories for fair dealing, no doubt encouraged by 
CCH’s existing large and liberal interpretive framework. Parody and 
satire are obvious additions, but it is in the new category of education 
that future controversy will reside.103 This amendment, coupled with 
the Alberta (Education) decision and the general bent of a pro-user 
Supreme Court of Canada, makes for a weary time for authors and 
owners, as they are at the “front end” of the copyright system rather 
than the “end user” end. I don’t think anyone now has doubts that 
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users have rights. Like no other commonwealth court, Canada’s 
Supreme Court has proclaimed that message loud and clear. The 
message that I hope the Court considers as well is that other players 
are also an integral part of the copyright balance. Ultimately, a way 
forward may be to go back to the ruling and spirit of CCH and weigh 
with approval Rothstein J’s dissent. 
Increasing certainty in fair dealing is important; it is a long-
standing preoccupation for all parties, not to mention the courts. 
But increased certainty will not happen in computing the optimal 
interpretive equation or by mechanically interpreting a specific set 
of factors.104 What may be more useful is to appreciate that Canada 
now boasts the legal tools to attain a large and liberal fair dealing 
interpretive framework. This flexible framework recognizes that there 
is no one-size-fits-all six-factor approach and that a more nuanced 
approach may be necessary depending on the types of uses at issue, 
over time. 
For instance, in a similar vein, Pamela Samuelson in the US 
argues for a more thoughtful and less rigid approach to deciding fair 
use cases. She suggests “unbundling fair uses” into “policy-relevant 
clusters.”105 The goal is to provide “courts with a more useful and 
nuanced toolkit for dealing with the plethora of plausible fair uses 
than can be achieved merely by focusing on the four factors set forth 
in the statute.”106 She also notes that, “given the considerable overlap 
among these uses…it makes little sense to organize fair use case law 
around each of these six uses.”107 Indeed, one of the goals of her work 
is “to embolden courts to consider additional factors, especially those 
of particular salience in certain policy clusters.”108
Parties and, ultimately, courts would do well to work within the 
current large and liberal fair dealing framework, as more complex uses 
of works will continue to arise. Aspiring toward a rigid interpretive 
structure will do little to achieve the balance sought by the Court in 
CCH, or meet the larger objectives copyright seeks. 
And above all, to ensure that more meaningful clarity is attained, 
as I argued elsewhere and as was endorsed in CCH, it is salutary for 
various groups to come together and fashion user guidelines.109 For 
instance, Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi recommend putting the 
balance back into copyright by “making a code of best practices in fair 
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use.”110 The same strategy can be applied to reach similar codes for 
specific sectors of Canada’s copyright communities that comport with 
fair dealing.111 Artists, musicians, writers and other creators (who 
are often on both sides of the issues as creators and users) and other 
individuals do not have the resources necessary to go to the court to 
obtain clarity.112 In this way, protracted litigation may be avoided and 
equally important access to justice issues addressed. 
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